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Mobility support is an essential part of IPv6 because we have recently seen sharp increases in the number of mobile users. A
security weakness in mobility support has a direct consequence on the security of users because it obscures the distinction between
devices and users. Unfortunately, a malicious and unauthenticated message in mobility support may open a security hole for
intruders by supplying an easy mean to launch an attack that hijacks an ongoing session to a location chosen by the intruder. In
this paper, we show how to thwart such a session hijacking attack by authenticating a suspicious message. Although much research
has been directed toward addressing similar problems, we contend that our proposed protocol would outperform other proposals
that have been advanced. This claim is based on observations that the proposed protocol has strengths such as light computational
load, backward compatibility, and dependable operation. The results of in-depth performance evaluation show that our protocol
achieves strong security and at the same time requires minimal computational overhead.
Copyright © 2009 Sehwa Song et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. Introduction
Mobile networking technologies, along with the prolifera-
tion of numerous portable and wireless devices, promise
to change people’s perceptions of the Internet. Mobility
support in Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) is considered
particularly important because mobile devices are predicted
to account for a significant portion of Internet users during
the lifetime of IPv6. Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) is an IP-layer
mobility protocol for the IPv6 Internet [1]. MIPv6 allows
an IPv6 mobile node (MN) to change its location on an
IPv6 network and still maintain its existing connections to
corresponding nodes (CNs).
In Mobile IP, an MN is addressed by two addresses, a
home address (HoA) and a care-of address (CoA). An MN
has its stationary HoA at its home subnet and changes its
temporary CoA whenever visiting a foreign subnet. This
dual address mechanism makes it possible to route packets
to an MN no matter where it is attached in the Internet.
Also, the complex dynamics that occur in the face of
sequential handovers are absolutely transparent to transport
and higher-layer protocols.
A link between an MN and a CN in Mobile IPv4 (MIPv4)
is always detoured via the MN’s Home Agent (HA), forming
a triangular path [2]. Packets from the CN are routed to
the HA and then tunneled, based on CoA, to the MN’s
location at the time. MIPv6 contained improvements to this
rather ineﬃcient routing. The new mechanism, called Route
Optimization (RO), requires the MN to update its CoA at the
CN whenever the MN changes its point of attachment to the
network. The RO in MIPv6 provides an illusion to protocol
layers above MIPv6 of continuing to be connected to the MN
located at its HoA address. At the same time, the RO rectifies
the suboptimal triangular routing by connecting the CN
directly to the MN. The MN may choose to inform the CN
of its new CoA by using a binding message, thereby allowing
the CN to send subsequent packets directly to the MN,
bypassing the HA. A binding is the association of the MN’s
HoA with the CoA for that MN. Unfortunately, malicious
and unauthenticated binding messages may open a security
hole for intruders by supplying an easy means to launch what
are called redirection attacks that hijack an ongoing session
to a location chosen by the intruder. IETF’s approach [1]
to preventing this type of attack is to authenticate the BU








Figure 1: Illustration of secure routing optimization in MIPv6.
There are six messages in total. The MN-HA path is securely
protected by the IPsec tunnel.
message at the CN and to examine a return path from the CN
to the claimed CoA to determine if the address is routable.
These two special routines are called Binding Update (BU)
and Return Routability (RR), respectively, and we refer to
this series of activities as a secure RO in order to emphasize
the security aspect in this RO.
In this paper we address the problem of securing the
routing optimization. This is a particularly diﬃcult problem
because of the following reasons. First, we cannot expect
a pre-established secure channel between communicating
nodes nor an infrastructure to support secure transactions
on behalf of communicating nodes [3]. In addition, the new
protocol should be eﬃcient in yielding real-time responsive-
ness and have a light computational load because delay in
the handover greatly aﬀects the quality of service (QoS) in
mobile applications. Last but not least, the proposed protocol
must be compatible with the legacy protocol to permit a
smooth transition.
Our goal in this paper is to take significant steps toward
a system that fulfills these criteria. In our protocol the MN
creates a secret and sends this secret to the CN twice, once in
the direct path to the CN and the other through an indirect
path via the HA. The secret is safe from snoopers because
it is wrapped in a self-encrypted message. Later, the MN
discloses its secret to the public. If the CN can decrypt the
MN’s early messages with this secret, the CN can confirm
the MN’s ownership. We evaluated the proposed protocol
by comparing its computational expense with five other
protocols. The result showed that the proposed protocol was
quite eﬃcient and, at the same time, satisfied in a secure
manner both ownership and return routability. The objective
in this paper is not to explain the cause of network anomalies
in the MIPv6. Instead, we seek to demonstrate the utility of
new primitives and techniques a future system could exploit
for eﬃcient handover.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 intro-
duce the RO in MIPv6 and discuss related works. Section 4
presents the result of vulnerability analysis. In Section 5, we
propose a new secure RO scheme. A performance analysis of
the proposed scheme is given in Section 6. Section 7 contains
our conclusions.
2. Route Optimization in Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6)
The secure RO in the MIPv6 is composed of six messages and
is shown in Figure 1. The first four messages are dedicated to
checking the RR of the CoA, and the last two messages are
used to authenticate the BU message.
The MN sends the Home Test Init (HoTI) and the Care-
of Test Init (CoTI) messages to initiate the binding update,
that is, updating the new CoA at the CN. These two messages
are sent almost simultaneously but along diﬀerent paths;
the CoTI is sent directly to the CN, and the HoTI is sent
indirectly via the HA; (1) are the HoTI and CoTI messages,
respectively,
HoTI = {HoA, CN,RH},
CoTI = {CoA, CN,RC},
(1)
RH and RC are cookies to match requests with the CN’s
corresponding responses.
The CN sends the Home Test (HoT) and the Care-of Test
(CoT) messages as responses to the previous messages. The
HoT and CoT messages are sent, respectively, to the source
addresses of the HoTI and CoTI, and follow the same delivery
paths as the HoTI and CoTI messages. The HoT and CoT
messages are shown, respectively, in
HoT = {CN, HoA,RH , HT, i}, (2)
CoT = {CN, CoA,RC, CT, j
}
. (3)
HT and CT are tokens generated by the CN and become a
secret key after concatenating these two tokens to authen-
ticate the BU message. HT and CT are shown, respectively,
in (4). HT and CT are saved in the CN’s hash under the
hash indices of i and j. The MN must later return these
hash indices in its BU message so that the CN can remain
stateless until the BU message is received. These hash indices
are included in the HoT and CoT















H(·) is a selected hash function, and First64(·) is a function
to choose the first 64 bits in the return string of the hash
function. Input to the hash function is the CN’s secret key
(KCN) and the concatenation of MN’s HoA, a nonce value
(Ni) and a zero. The generation of CoT is quite similar to the
HoT, and extension to the CoT should be straightforward.
The legitimate MN now possesses both tokens and
generates a secret key (Kbm) as shown in
Kbm = H(HT‖CT). (5)
This marks the end of the RR procedure. The MN may now
generate the BU message and is ready to send
BU = {CoA, CN, HoA, SEQ, LT, i, j, MACBU
}
. (6)
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This BU message as shown above is sent from the MN’s CoA
to the CN. In addition to the CoA, HoA, CN, a sequence
number (SEQ), valid lifetime (LT) for this binding update,
and the two hash indices are included in the BU message.
MACBU is the sign of the BU message using Kbm.
On reception of the BU message, the CN recovers Kbm
from the hash indices included in the BU message and verifies
the sign. If the sign proves authentic, the CN accepts the BU
message and the MN’s CoA by sending an acknowledgment
to the MN. The binding acknowledgement (BA) message is
shown in
BA = {CN, CoA, SEQ, LT, MACBA}. (7)
The security of the RR and BU protocols hinges on the
management of HT and CT. Note that no one except the CN
can manipulate HT and CT because of the unknown KCN.
However, HT and CT are available to anyone in the delivery
path because they are delivered in clear text. If an adversary
happens to collect a pair of HT and CT in the network, the
secure RO is vulnerable to a redirection attack [4].
From a security perspective, the MN’s duty as defined in
the RFC 3775 is twofold [1]. First, when the MN updates
its temporary CoA at the CN, the MN should corroborate
to the CN that the CoA is a temporary version of the HoA
and that the HoA and CoA are both owned by the MN. The
stationary HoA serves as an identifier for the MN. Second,
from the perspective of the CN, rather than being informed
by the MN that the MN’s address has changed to the new
CoA, it would be safer for the CN to participate actively in
this binding update procedure by confirming the existence
and the routability of the MN’s CoA. This is very important
because a dishonest MN could advertise a fake CoA. The
former duty is implemented in the BU, and the latter is
accomplished in the RR.
The MIPv6 is an extended version of the IPv6 imple-
mented to support tetherless mobility to nodes but has
no role in strengthening the security of the IPv6. Hence,
many good security features are excluded from the MIPv6,
including authentication. Indeed, authentication to the MN
is excluded and furthermore is not necessary in the MIPv6.
This is because, first, the security policy in the MIPv6 tries
only to maintain a degree of security equal at least to
the security of the IPv6 and enforces only authentication
of the BU message and the RR. Second, the overhead
associated with authentication is too big. Authentication
necessitates establishment of a session key for the two
nodes, a step that then requires a key management mech-
anism. Third, at the moment when the MIPv6 starts to
work, authentication in the second layer has already been
completed. For instance, typical authentication mechanisms
in the second layer are Wi-Fi Protected Access2 (WPA2)
in 802.11 [5], Privacy and Key Management v2 (PKMv2)
in 802.16e [6], and Authentication and Key Agreement
(AKA) in Universal Mobile Telecommunications (UMTS)
[7]. Additional authentication in the MIPv6 is unnecessary
for valid users in the second layer, but nevertheless, the
MIPv6 monitors the behavior of these users after authenti-
cation.
3. Related Work
One popular approach for a secure RO was to establish
a secure relationship between the CN and the MN. The
CN first authenticated the MN so as to set up a secure
channel and then exchanged useful information over this
secure channel. Certificate-based Binding Update (CBU)
[8], Hierarchical Certificate-based Binding Update (HCBU)
[9], and Leakage-Resilient Security Architecture (LR-AKE)
[10] incorporated private key cryptography to establish a
secure relationship. Because the MN is authenticated, the
CN can trust all messages from the MN. Such attacks as
impersonation, message modification, and eavesdropping
are quite diﬃcult in the secure channel. As a result, the
CN can be sure that CoA is owned by the MN and
is reachable. Nonetheless, we contend that the proposed
protocol has many advantages over a protocol with private
key cryptography as follows.
(1) The certificate management is known to be a big
overhead in the operation of asymmetric cryp-
tography. In particular, revoking a certificate and
managing the list of revoked certificate are such
overheads. The proposed protocol dispenses with the
certificate and its management.
(2) The MN and CN may belong to diﬀerent security
domains. In this case interdomain protocol for asym-
metric cryptography can be quite subtle, rendering
its advantages forfeit. The proposed protocol runs
the same irrespective of the domains the both parties
belong.
(3) The proposed protocol is quicker than the one
with asymmetric cryptography in completing the
bind update. This lower delay helps the MN to
complete handover quicker. Furthermore, relatively
light computations in the proposed protocol extend
battery lifetime of mobile devices.
Greg and Michael [11] proposed another secure RO
protocol, called the Child-proof Authentication for MIPv6
(CAM), using only a private/public key pair without resort-
ing to certification of public keys. In this approach, the
interface identifier of IPv6 addresses is computed from a
public key and auxiliary parameters via a cryptographic
one-way hash function. The MN uses the corresponding
private key to assert address ownership and to sign messages
sent from this address without PKI or any other security
infrastructure. The binding between the public key and
the address at the CN can be verified by recomputing the
hash value and by comparing this hash value with the
interface identifier. However, the CN cannot confirm return
routability to the CoA. Further, the computation load on
the MN side is heavy because every BU message requires
the MN to generate a signature and the CN to verify it.
The question has been raised of whether private key
cryptography is the only approach for a secure BU. Much
research has been geared toward developing a secure BU that
contains less expensive cryptography. Veigner and Rong [12,
13] proposed a new route optimization protocol for MIPv6








Figure 2: Illustration of a session hijacking attack. Because the (1)
and (3) messages are sent independently, the sequence of messages
is irrelevant.
(ROM). In their proposal, the MN uses the ROM protocol
to assign a unique hash value to its currently used CN.
The hash value is sent via the HA-CN path. Simultaneously
the home subnet of the MN is authenticated by the CN by
means of a three-way handshake. This means that now when
it moves into a new subnet, the MN only has to send a
BU message directly to the CN. The CN considers the BU
message authentic because of the MN’s knowledge of the
nonce value. This nonce value included in the BU message
was previously used when generating the CN’s unique hash
value. The MN with the paired secret (i.e., a nonce and hash
value) first sends the irreversible hash value via an indirect
path and has itself authenticated by the CN and then, to
assert its ownership of both the HoA and CoA, discloses the
nonce value through the direct path. The rather expensive
private key cryptography of the approach discussed earlier is
replaced by the hash operation. This protocol is similar to
our proposed algorithm in its use of a paired secret. Our
work complements this earlier work by providing another
fully designed routing optimization protocol. However, the
main diﬀerences between the two protocols include (1) the
ROM protocol is not compatible backward with the legacy
protocol, and (2) at the end of the ROM protocol, the MN
shows the ownership of both the HoA and the CoA addresses
but fails to assure the CN that the claimed CoA is routable.
4. Vulnerability of Route Optimization
in MIPv6
The goal of a secure RO is to assure the CN that the MN
owns the claimed CoA and that this temporary address is
reachable in the Internet. Also, the design goal is motivated
by the desire to achieve a security level equivalent to that
of the IP network without creating major new security
problems [14]. Hence, the goal is not to protect against
attacks that were already possible before the introduction
of IP mobility. Nonetheless, the security protocol in MIPv6
remains vulnerable to a few critical attacks. We discuss the
cause and eﬀect of the attacks in further detail in the next
section.
4.1. Three Weaknesses in MIPv6. We have found at least three
weaknesses in MIPv6. A brief summary of each one is as
follows.
(1) The two tokens HT in (2) and CT in (3) make up the
secret BU key. These tokens are delivered in clear text.
Anyone can easily acquire HT and CT.
(2) Message authentication in the BU is completed after
the CN receives the fifth message. Any earlier authen-
tication for HoTI and CoTI is impossible because the
MN and the CN do not share a secret key in advance.
Hence, the CN must respond to all BU requests. This
unconditional response involves an addition to its
database, and an adversary may mount a memory
overflow attack by sending meaningless BU requests.
(3) The two tokens are created independently of each
other. This is because the tokens are created entirely
by the CN, and the CoA is new to the CN and has
never been used with the associated HoA. The CN is
not able to bind the HoA with the CoA at the time
of receiving HoTI and CoTI. The CN’s ignorance of
the association between the CoA and HoA at an early
stage makes it almost impossible to generate a pair
of related tokens. Because of this independence, the
CN checks only to determine if a returning token
is the one given by the CN but fails to determine if
these two tokens come from a single source or from
two diﬀerent sources. An adversary needs only to
manipulate the CoTI and to deceive only the CN to
succeed in hijacking a session to a new CoA of the
adversary’s choice.
4.2. Vulnerability in MIPv6 (Session Hijacking Attack). A
session hijacking attack (or redirection attack) is initiated
by an adversary located between the HA and the CN. An
illustration of this attack flow is depicted in Figure 2. This
adversary intercepts the HoT message sent by the CN to
the MN, a target victim. This message is in clear text, and
the adversary can extract the token from the message (see
(2)). This HT token is the first half of the session key for
the BU. The adversary sends the forged CoTI message to
the CN. An address chosen by the adversary appears as the
source address in this message. Let us denote the forged
CoTI message and the adversary’s address to the CoTIa and
CoAa, respectively. The CN would accept the CoTIa message
because of the second vulnerability described in Section 4.1.
The CN generates CTa and returns this token enclosed in
the CoTa message to the adversary. CoAa appears as the
destination address in the CoTa message. This CoTa message
is also in clear text, and the adversary acquires the second half
of the token necessary to derive the session key. The adversary
generates the Kbm according to (5) and sends the forged BU
message as if it were the legitimate MN updating the new
CoA.
The CN extracts the hash indices from the BU messages
and reads the two tokens from its hash. Using (5) the CN
recovers Kbm = H(HT‖CTa) and validates the sign in the BU
message. The validation should pass, because the CN’s Kbm is
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the same as the adversary’s Kbm. The CN accepts the forged
BU and starts to communicate with the adversary located
at CoAa. The MN’s session thus has been hijacked by the
adversary.
This session hijacking attack exploits the third vulnera-
bility discussed in Section 4.1; that is, the two tokens that
make up the session key for the BU are created without
any common factors between them. This independent key
creation lays the foundation for exploitation by the adversary.
From the perspective of the adversary, replacing the CoA
with CoAa is quite simple because it is the only thing required
in order to send the forged CoTIa and to remember the CTa
in the CoTa. It is such a simple attack that the adversary
does not need to manipulate HT and the messages associated
with HT (i.e., HoTI and HoT). If we could design the BU
to have HT and CT share meaningful components known
to the CN and to the MN, a session hijack attack would
not be so simple. In such a case the change only to the CT
is insuﬃcient because the HT and CTa would then share a
common factor diﬀerent from the one the CN recognizes.
Hence, the adversary must forge HoTI and HoTa and HTa as
well as CTa for the attack to succeed. Forging HT and those
related messages is more diﬃcult than forging the CT. This
is because (1) the adversary must be present not only in the
CN-MN path but also in the CN-HA path; (2) the adversary
must block the HoTa that is destined for the HoA. The MN
would be very suspicious if it found the HoTa generated as a
return of the HoTI that the MN had never sent. However,
this blockage by an adversary would be almost impossible
without having control of a router or a switch along the CN-
HA path, which we believe it is quite diﬃcult. Hence, our
design principle for the new BU is to introduce a common
factor shared only between the MN and the CN.
5. The Proposed Routing Optimization Protocol
Based upon the foregoing observations, we proposed a novel
protocol for a secure RO in the MIPv6. We will discuss
protocol requirements first and then the basic protocol
proposed in this paper.
5.1. Protocol Requirements. Some requirements were deter-
mined in the course of designing the protocol. These require-
ments were selected after taking into consideration both
practical implementation issues and performance issues. Five
requirements summarize the most desirable attributes of the
new protocol.
(i) Ownership. The MN can corroborate to the CN that the
claimed CoA is owned by the MN. Also, the MN should be
able to verify the CoA’s binding with the MN’s original HoA.
(ii) Routability. The CN should be certain that the new CoA
is valid and reachable in the network.
(iii) Dependency. In the legacy protocol, the MN is given the
session key (Kbm) and uses it to authenticate the BU message.
This requirement will change how the two tokens are created.
These two tokens must rely upon each other and in order to
thwart any session hijacking attack and must share a factor
that cannot be forged.
(iv) Compatibility and Easy Implementation. The new pro-
tocol should be easy to implement and introduce the lesser
imperative amendments to the existing MIPv6 protocol so
that the transition to the new protocol is smooth and
transparent to end users.
(v) No Degradation of QoS. The new protocol should not
degrade QoS in the MIPv6, especially the speed of handover.
The first two requirements are essential because they
are the security requirements and the main purpose of
the BU and of RR, respectively. We show in Section 6.1
how the new protocol satisfies these first two requirements.
Satisfaction of the third requirement is discussed in the
security analysis of the protocol in Section 6.2. The last two
requirements are discussed in Section 6.3 in which we discuss
the computational overhead of the protocol.
5.2. The Proposed Protocol. The proposed protocol inherits
the strength of the legacy RO protocol in MIPv6 and elimi-
nates the weaknesses identified by ourselves and mentioned
in the related work. The advantages of the proposed protocol
are concentrated in the design of the BU message. The roles
and consequences of the rest of the messages are quite similar
to those of the legacy protocol except for minor modification
of the messages.
The MN initiates the BU by sending HoTI and CoTI
shown in
HoTI = {HoA, CN,RH ,T1},
CoTI = {CoA, CN,RC ,T2}.
(8)
RH and RC are the random numbers to match, respectively,
HoT with HoTI and CoT with CoTI. Without these parame-
ters, mapping HoT to HoTI in the MN would be diﬃcult in
a situation such as one in which the MN might send multiple
HoTI messages (or CoTI) because of retransmissions. Once
the response arrives, the MN is unable to map this response
to the multiple HoTI messages. The CN must return this
random number in its response to avoid confusion in the
MN.
T1 and T2 are the tokens generated by the MN in the
proposed system. These tokens are shown in
S = H(p‖q), (9)
T1 = HoA⊕ S, T2 = CoA⊕ q, (10)
where p and q are the quite large random numbers and input
values to the one-way hash function H(·). It is believed that
finding input values p and q from S in a reasonable time
boundary is almost impossible because of the one-wayness
of the hash function which is consisted of is also impossible.
Note that T1 and T2 share the common number q and p in S
which is known only to the MN and nobody else.
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HoT and CoT are the CN’s responses shown in
HoT = {CN, HoA,RH , HT1, i},




These equations are the same as (2) and (3) in the legacy
protocol except that the two tokens, HT and CT, are replaced,
respectively, by HT1 and CT1. We no longer use the session
key Kbm to authenticate the BU message. HT1 and CT1 are
instead referred to as cookies in our system and elaborated,
respectively, in
HT1 = Ni ⊕ Kcn,
CT1 = Nj ⊕ Kcn.
(12)
Ni and Nj are the two nonce values generated by the CN.
These nonce values and two tokens, T1 and T2, are saved in
the CN’s hash under the hash indices of i and j. The indices,
i and j, are included, respectively, in HoT and CoT. The CN
expects to receive these indices in the next message. In this
way, the CN remains stateless, dispensing with the need to
remember these parameters.
The binding message is shown in
BU =
{
CoA, CN, HoA, i, j, LT, SEQ,Ni ⊕Nj , p
}
. (13)
Ni and Nj are used with KCN to verify the return routability
of CoA by determining whether the MN returns Ni ⊕ Nj in
the BU message. KCN is the secret key owned by the CN and
used to protect Ni and Nj , respectively, in the HoT and CoT
messages. The MN should receive both the HoT and CoT
messages and extract HT1 and CT1. By XORing HT1 and CT1
the MN can calculate Ni ⊕ Nj and include this in the BU
message. Notably, the MN discloses p in this message. The
BU message is authenticated with the MN’s presentation of
its secrets p to the CN.
The CN validates the BU message and then accepts the
consequences of the return routability:
BA = {CN, CoA, LT}. (14)
The CN confirms the BU by sending binding acknowledg-
ment (BA) as shown in (14). CoA appears as the destination
address in the BA message.
6. Performance Evaluation
We evaluated diverse aspects of the performance of the
protocol. This evaluation includes an analysis to illustrate
how the new protocol copes with the vulnerability of the
legacy protocol and how it meets the five requirements
specified earlier. A comparison of the computational cost
between the five protocols is included. The delay involved
in completing the secure RO is measured in terms of three
popular wireless access networks, and the implications of this
delay are described.
6.1. Security Analysis. By using the binding update in the
proposed protocol, the MN can assure the CN that the MN
is reachable (or routable) at the claimed CoA and that this
MN is the owner of the HoA and CoA. The routability and
ownership are the two security requirements and we intend
to demonstrate that the proposed protocol is securely sound
by showing that the proposed protocol satisfies these two
requirements.
Ni and Nj are sent in the HoT and CoT messages by the
CN and securely wrapped by the CN’s secret, KCN · Ni is
directed to HoA along the indirect path, and Nj is directed to
CoA along the direct path. In receiving the BU message, the
CN retrieves Ni and Nj from its hash using i and j (see (13))
and calculates Ni ⊕ Nj . The CN checks to see if the returned
Ni⊕Nj is identical to the one calculated. The correct Ni⊕Nj
indicates that the MN is reachable at HoA and CoA in both
paths. In other words, the CN can ensure the routability of
the return path to the MN.
In this scenario, an adversary impersonating the MN
could have intercepted HoT and CoT and calculated Ni ⊕Nj
in the same way the MN did. However, the calculations
required of the adversary would not be as simple as they
might seem. The MN is assigned a new CoA in the foreign
network, and this address has never before been associated
with the MN’s HoT. The adversary would not be able to
couple CoT with the corresponding HoT if a fairly large
number of BU messages were passing by. This coupling
is also diﬃcult for the CN. This is why CN retains KCN
unchanged in generating HT1 and CT1 and even uses a
constant KCN across diﬀerent binding updates. However,
it remains possible, even if it seems quite improbable, for
adversaries to couple HT1 and CT1. Hence, it is not enough
for the CN to assure the RR by presenting Ni ⊕ Nj alone.
The proposed protocol compensates for this drawback by
authenticating the BU message. Because the message is
authentic, the content of this message is also authentic.
Using the hash indices i and j, the CN retrieves Ni
and T1 using hash index i and do the same for Nj and
T2 using hash index j. The CN XORs T1 with the received
HoA and compares the output with the hash function of
p and q; that is, HoA ⊕ T1 = HoA ⊕ HoA ⊕ S =
H(p‖q). Algorithm 1 elaborates the CN’s procedure to
validate the BU message. Let us hypothesize that adversaries
have intercepted a number of HoTI and CoTI messages in the
network and also have been lucky enough to find a pair of T1
and T2. Even in this extreme scenario, it is almost impossible
for the adversary to find p due to the one-wayness of the
hash. No one except the MN that has sent HoTI and CoTI
is able to present p to the CN. If the MN presents the right
P-value, the CN concludes that this MN also sent HoTI and
CoTI, confirming the MN’s ownership of the CoA.
HoA and CoA are included in the BU message not only
to compute S but also to preclude a dishonest MN from
claiming a diﬀerent CoA in the BU message than the CoA
reported in the CoTI message.
6.2. A Suggested Solution for the Three Weaknesses. RO
vulnerability is attributable to the three weaknesses discussed
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Data: index i, j, p, N1
⊕
N2, HoA, CoA, Hash
Result: Which Verification is confirmed
Begin
Extract T1, N ′1, T2, N
′
2 from Table of CN by i and j
if N1
⊕
N2 is a N ′1
⊕
N ′2 then /∗ return routability is confirmed ∗/
Compute q′ = T2
⊕
CoA
X = H(p‖q′) and H(p‖q) = T1
⊕
HoA
if H(p‖q) is Xthen /∗ ownership is confirmed ∗/
return Verification succeeded
else /∗ ownership is failed ∗/
return Verification failed
else /∗ return routability is failed ∗/
return Verification failed
end
Algorithm 1: Verification procedure by CN.
in Section 4.1. A solution to any one of these three may
remedy the vulnerability in the RO.
The first cause of RO vulnerability lies with delivery of
the two tokens in clear text. The remedy requires a shared
key to encrypt the tokens as well as authentication and a
key exchange protocol for establishing the session key. This
additional protocol is a heavy burden for a mobile device.
Delayed authentication causes the CN to accept all HoTI
and CoTI messages that request an RO. Early authentication
to the MN may be a good solution for this problem.
However, following the same reasoning as discussed in the
first cause, authentication necessitates a secret key, and we do
not consider adding computational overhead to the existing
protocol a viable option.
With the complications posed by solutions to the first
and second vulnerabilities, we turn to the third of these and
suggest another route to closing all three loopholes. The third
vulnerability that we discussed originates in the generation
by the CN of the two tokens independently of each other.
Our solution to this problem is to have the two tokens share a
common factor at the time of the generation. In the proposed
protocol, q is this common factor. Addition of this feature
complicates a session hijacking attack tremendously because
an adversary must forge the two tokens and their related
message simultaneously, a feat that we believe verges on
impossible. In the legacy protocol, embedding a relationship
into the two tokens was impossible because they are created
by the CN, which has no knowledge of them at the time of
their generation. In the proposed protocol, however, the MN
generated the two tokens on behalf of the CN without any
diﬃculty in pairing CoA and HoA.
6.3. Computational Comparison. The proposed protocol
maintains backward compatibility with the legacy protocol.
The new protocol contains six messages, and the role of each
message remains the same as in the legacy protocol. The
transition to the new protocol is straightforward because this
requires only a software upgrade in the kernel.
We compared the computational expenses for the six
protocols described in Section 3; CAM [11], the proposed
protocol, the legacy protocol [1], ROM [12], CBU [8],
and LR-AKE [10]. Because the number of messages to
complete the RO is diﬀerent from protocol to protocol,
we compared them in terms of the computational expense
in each message. Table 1 shows the computational expense
for each message up to the thirteenth message. In order to
distinguish operations in MN, CN and HA, cells in the table
have diﬀerent backgrounds.
The proposed protocol, which is only backward compat-
ible with the legacy protocol, comprises the six messages.
The ROM protocol is also composed of six messages, but
nonetheless is incompatible with the legacy protocol. In
order to form the BU message (see the fifth message in
Table 1), the legacy protocol uses one 768-bit HMAC and one
128-bit SHA-1, respectively, to compute Kbm (see (5)) and
to sign the BU message (see (6)). The MN in the proposed
protocol computes the one XOR operation for the same
message. In order to complete the BU (see the fifth and
sixth messages in Table 1), the legacy protocol, the proposed
protocol, and ROM, respectively, use five HMAC-SHA-1
operations and two SHA-1 operations, two XOR operations
and one hash operation, and one hash operation. CAM is
composed of two messages and the most eﬃcient in terms of
the number of messages. In contrast LR-AKE has the greatest
number of messages. Operations to form each message are
quite diverse from one protocol to another, ranging from
simple XOR to expensive asymmetric decryption.
Figures 3 and 4 show the computational delays of the
six protocols in completing the RO. The delay taken by the
each operation as shown in Table 1 is modeled by its average
value. The delays of operations done by the three nodes
are summed together and plotted in Figures 3 and 4. (LR-
AKE requires two HAs for MN and CN, resp. We did not
diﬀerentiate these two HAs in the computation.) Some of
the protocols show diﬀerent delay measurements, depending
upon whether it is the first handover or the second or later
handovers. Although Figure 3 depicts the computational
delay for the first handover, Figure 4 shows the delay for later
handovers. In a continuing sense, the compilation in Table 1
bases RO security in terms of the first handover. CBU and
LR-AKE are protocols that fit this definition, and the delay
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Table 1: Computational expenses to form each message. The table shows the comparison for up to 13 messages. Although CAM needs
only two messages, LR-AKE requires 13 messages to complete the RO. Note that cells in the table have diﬀerent backgrounds to distinguish
nodes these operations are computed. (MU: multiplication, SU: subtract, XR: XOR, MO: modulo, DV: division, EX: exponentiation, HS:
one-way hash function, HM: keyed-hash for message authentication, ES: symmetric encryption, DS: symmetric decryption, EPU: asymmetric
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Figure 3: Computational delay for the first handover.
diﬀerence between the first and later handovers is quite sub-
stantial. These two protocols use private key cryptography to
establish a session key at the first handover. This approach to


























Figure 4: Computational delay for the second and later handovers.
After the second handover, the MN and CN encrypt and
decrypt messages using symmetric cryptography. The pro-
posed protocol is the fastest in the first handover while CBU
and LR-AKE are the fastest in the second and later handovers.




















Figure 5: Delays to complete RO in three popular wireless access
technologies. We repeated RO for each protocol one thousand times
and plotted the outcome in a boxplot.
The delay with the legacy protocol is almost more than
four times longer than with the new protocol. The speed of
the new protocol is attributed to the transition from frequent
hash operations in the legacy protocol to XOR and few hash
operations in the new protocol. The delay of the proposed
protocol outperforms the ROM protocol by 2 microseconds.
Although the diﬀerence is insignificant the ROM cannot
guarantee return routability to the CN. The computational
delay in CAM is quite interesting. It uses an asymmetric
signature for the first message in the MN and turns to a one-
way hash function and signature verification for the second
message in the CN. Although only two messages are used in
CAM to complete a secure RO, the computational delay is
quite long because of the computation load.
We have implemented the legacy and proposed pro-
tocols in three popular wireless access technologies; High
Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA), 802.16e [15],
and 802.11g [16], illustrated in Figure 5. This is not to
compare the performance of these protocols but rather to
measure actual delays in order to determine whether it is
appropriate to suggest deployment of these protocols in the
real environment. This measurement is especially important
to developers and engineers in the mobile industry because
a delay in the handover greatly influences QoS in mobile
applications. The handover in 802.11g completes a secure
RO in 14 milliseconds, which is the shortest among the
three protocols. About 10 Mbps is the measured data rate
of 802.11g and is greater than the 1.3 Mbps of HSDPA and
the 3.6 Mbps of 802.16e. Table 2 shows the maximum data
rates of the three technologies in terms of measurement and
specification. The delay in HSDPA and 802.16e takes longer
than 200 milliseconds, which is not appropriate for real-time
applications such as IP telephony. The RO in 802.16g is faster
than the one in HSDPA because of a higher data rate. We
expect Long Term Evolution (LTE) and 802.16m, which are
the next versions of HSDPA and 802.16e, respectively, within







HSDPA 1.3 Mbps/66 Kbps 14.4 Mbps/2 Mbps
802.16e 3.6 Mbps/423 Kbps 46 Mbps/4 Mbps
802.11g 10.3 Mbps/9.4 Mbps 54 Mbps
the next year or so [17]. These new technologies will boost
the data rate in the access network to 30 Mbps. Then, those
delay-sensitive real-time applications should not have any
problems running on these access technologies.
7. Conclusion
The two special routines in the secure RO are BU and RR,
and the purposes of these routines are to show to the CN
that the claimed CoA is a temporary address of the MN and
is reachable in the network.
The legacy RO in MIPv6 has a critical vulnerability that
could let an adversary hijack an ongoing session to a location
chosen by the adversary. This vulnerability is attributed to
three weaknesses we found in the RO. The worst weakness
is that the two tokens that compose the session key do not
share a common factor. This weakness allows an adversary
to manipulate CoTI alone, in order to initiate a session
hijacking attack. We have proposed a secure RO protocol.
This protocol requires only a light computational load and
is compatible with the legacy protocol. Most important, this
protocol provides a secure BU and RR.
To illustrate its practicality we compared the cost of
establishing a secure RO with the proposed protocol with
five other protocols that propose to create a secure RO. In
addition, we have implemented the proposed and the legacy
protocols to measure the communication delay in their
use with three wireless access technologies. The evaluation
results show that the proposed protocol performs well in
terms of low computational cost and minimal delay.
References
[1] D. Johnson, C. Perkins, and J. Arkko, “Mobility support in
IPv6,” RFC 3775, June 2004.
[2] C. Perken, “IP Mobility Support,” RFC 2002, October 1996.
[3] T. Aura, “Mobile IPv6 security,” in Security Protocols, pp. 3–13,
2004.
[4] K. Elgoarany and M. Eltoweissy, “Security in mobile IPv6: a
survey,” Information Security Technical Report, vol. 12, no. 1,
pp. 32–43, 2007.
[5] J.-C. Chen, M.-C. Jiang, and Y. I.-W. Liu, “Wireless LAN
security and IEEE 802.11l,” IEEE Wireless Communications,
vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 27–36, 2005.
[6] D. Johnston and J. Walker, “Overview of IEEE 802.16 security,”
IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 40–48, 2004.
[7] G. M. Koien, “An introduction to access security in UMTS,”
IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 8–18, 2004.
10 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
[8] R. H. Deng, J. Zhou, and F. Bao, “Defending against redirect
attacks in mobile IP,” in Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’02), pp. 59–
67, Washington, DC, USA, 2002.
[9] K. Ren, W. Lou, K. Zeng, F. Bao, J. Zhou, and R. H. Deng,
“Routing optimization security in mobile IPv6,” Computer
Networks, vol. 50, no. 13, pp. 2401–2419, 2006.
[10] H. Fathi, S. Shin, K. Kobara, S. S. Chakraborty, H. Imai, and
R. Prasad, “Leakage-resilient security architecture for mobile
IPv6 in wireless overlay networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected
Areas in Communications, vol. 23, no. 11, pp. 2182–2192, 2005.
[11] O. S. Greg and R. Michael, “Child-proof authentication for
MIPv6 (CAM),” ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication
Review, vol. 31, pp. 4–8, 1984.
[12] C. Veigner and C. Rong, “A new route optimization protocol
for Mobile IPv6 (ROM),” in Proceedings of the International
Computer Symposium, Taipei, Taiwan, 2004.
[13] C. Veigner and C. Rong, “Flooding attack on the binding cache
in mobile IPv6,” 2007.
[14] P. Nikander, J. Arkko, T. Aura, and G. Montenegro, “Mobile
IP version 6 (MIPv6) route optimization security design,” in
Proceedings of the 58th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference
(VTC ’03), vol. 3, pp. 2004–2008, Orlando, Fla, USA, 2003.
[15] N. Johnston and H. Aghvami, “Comparing WiMAX and
HSPA—a guide to the technology,” BT Technology Journal, vol.
25, no. 2, pp. 191–199, 2007.
[16] D. Vassis, G. Kormentzas, A. Rouskas, and I. Maglogiannis,
“The IEEE 802.11g standard for high data rate WLANs,” IEEE
Network, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 21–26, 2005.
[17] S. Ortiz Jr., “4G wireless begins to take shape,” Computer, vol.
40, no. 11, pp. 18–21, 2007.
